Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings Under
Proposed Section 1407 of the Judicial
Code: Unanswered Questions of
Transfer and Review
In 1965 Mr. Chief Justice Warren submitted to Congress a proposal
that would add to Title 28 of the United States Code a new transfer
provision drafted by the Judicial Conference of the United States' in
response to a recent flood of civil antitrust litigation. Proposed section
14072 would create a judicial panel with power to order the temporary
I The Judicial Conference, a permanent organization chartered by Congress, brings
together representatives of the federal judiciary from all of the areas of the United States.
It carries on a continuous study of the federal courts and recommends rule changes to the
Supreme Court and legislation to Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 831 (1964); Maris, Federal Procedural Rule Making: The Program of the Judicial Conference, 47 A.B.A.J. 772 (1961).
2 "Proposed § 1407. Multi-District Litigation
"(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such
proceedings will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions: Provided, however,
That no action shall be so transferred without the consent of the district court in which
it is pending. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it °was transferred unless
it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate
any claim, cross-claim, counter-ciaim, or third party claim and remand any of such claims
before the remainder of the action is remanded.
"(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted by a judge
or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel, a circuit judge or a district judge may
be designated and assigned temporarily for service in the transferee district by the Chief
Justice of the United States or the chief judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee
district court, such actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such
district. The judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated
when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for
the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.
"(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated by the
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation by notice to the parties in all actions in which
transfers for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated. Such
notice shall specify the manner, time, and place of the hearing to determine whether the
transfer shall be made. The panel's order of transfer shall be entered in the office of the
clerk of the district court of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus
entered. With the order so filed there shall be filed the consent of the district courts from
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transfer of civil actions involving common questions of fact to a single
district for purposes of coordinated pretrial proceedings, after which
the actions would be returned to their original districts for trial. This
comment analyzes the powers of the transferee court and judicial panel
under the new section. It gives particular attention to the principles
which might apply to the difficult problem of appellate review of section
1407 orders, and discusses criteria which the panel might consider in
selecting those cases most suited for consolidation.
I.

Tm

HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSAL

Proposed section 1407 resulted from the 1961 conviction of certain
electrical equipment manufacturers and executives for conspiracy to
violate the antitrust laws. 3 Soon after the termination of the criminal
actions large numbers of civil treble damage actions were filed in the
federal courts against the corporate defendants.4 The possibility that
which the actions are transferred. The clerk of the transferee district court shall forthwith
transmit a certified copy of such order to the clerk of the district court of the district from
which the action is being transferred.
"(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two
of whom shall be from the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel.
"(e) When actions are transferred hereunder, no district court refusing to consent to
transfer of related litigation may make any order for or permit discovery in conflict with
the discovery proceedings in the transferred actions.
"(f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with
Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
3 The criminal indictments charged twenty-nine manufacturing corporations and fortyfour executives with conspiracies in twenty different product lines of heavy electrical
equipment with total annual sales in excess of one and a half billion dollars. All the
defendants pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. No opinion was published. See references
at General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1964); Application of California, 195 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Smith, The Incredible Electrical
Conspiracy (pt. 1), Fortune, April 1961, pp. 132-33. Seven executives were sent to jail for
one month; twenty-three others were given suspended sentences and put on probation for
five years. Nearly two million dollars in fines were levied against the twenty-nine corporations, ranging from $437,500 to $7,500. See Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy
(pts. 1-2), Fortune, April 1961, pp. 132, 133-34, May 1961, pp. 161, 222.
4 Over 1,900 separate treble damage actions were ultimately filed under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Most of these were commenced in 1962,
increasing fivefold the total number of civil antitrust cases usually filed in the federal
district courts during one year. See 1964 DMECTOR OF THE AmuNISraTIVE OrFFxc OF THE
UNITED STATES CouRTs ANN. REP. 151 [hereinafter cited as 1964 DnmaroR's REPORT]. "The
only other group of private antitrust cases comparable in magnitude to the electrical
equipment litigation were the motion picture cases ....
[T]he motion picture cases were
fewer, aggregating one-third to one-half the number of electrical equipment suits, and
they were filed comparatively evenly over a longer period of time, producing a much
smaller load on the courts." Neal & Goldberg, The ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Cases:
Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 622 (1964).
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this litigation would disrupt entire dockets 5 prompted the Judicial
Conference to create what came to be known as the Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation 6 and to confer upon it the unprecedented
responsibility of coordinating pretrial proceedings in these cases.7 Although handicapped by the lack of a provision in the United States
Code or Federal Rules under which a coordinated discovery program
could be compelled," and forced to rely on the voluntary cooperation of
often skeptical district judges, 9 the committee organized a nationally
coordinated pretrial program of such success' ° that the committee was
encouraged to concern itself with developing general principles for use
in any future similar litigation." In 1964 the Judicial Conference
authorized the committee to explore the possibility of recommending
2
legislation toward this end.'
After nearly a year of studying the ad hoc procedures employed in
the electrical cases, the committee drafted section 140713 on the premise
5 See 1962 DRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN.

REP. 95 [hereinafter cited as 1962 DIRECTOR'S REPORT]; Neal & Goldberg, supra note 4, at
622.
6 1962 DIRECTOR'S REPORT 95. The Co-ordinating Committee (hereinafter referred to as
the committee) was created as a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference's standing
Committee on Pretrial Procedure. Ibid.
7 Ibid. Technically the committee was appointed "to consider discovery problems arising
in multiple litigation with common witnesses and exhibits." Ibid. "[I]n creating the subcommittee the Judicial Conference indicated its belief that the problems of multiple
related cases might extend beyond the immediate pressures of the electrical equipment
cases and that the general problem merited sustained attention from the conference." Neal
& Goldberg, supra note 4, at 623.
8 Id. at 623.
9 See ibid.; 1963 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

ANN. REP. 49, 102; 1962 DIRECTOR'S REPORT 95.
10 National hearings were held by the committee to permit counsel in the cases to express their views before any procedures were recommended for coordinating pretrial proceedings. Appropriate local proceedings were then held by individual judges to hear each
party's objections to the recommendations and to implement those recommendations the
judge deemed proper. Neal & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 623-24.
Over thirty-five national pretrial orders were recommended by the committee, providing
for uniform interrogatories and document requests, establishing two centralized document
depositories containing over one million documents, and governing the scheduling of
depositions which were made applicable to all cases. The early determination of common
questions of law was expedited by setting up schedules for hearing objections to the complaints. Id. at 624-28. For a comprehensive analysis of the committee and the electrical
cases, see Neal & Goldberg, supra note 4.
11 See 1962 DRECToR's REPORT 78-79.
12 1964 DIRCTOR'S REPORT 42, 43.
13 CO-ORDINATING CoM~rrrE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRmIT

COURTS, COMMENT ON PROPOSED § 1407, at 1 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as COMMIrEE
COMMENT]. On the recommendation of its standing Committee on Revision of -the Laws, the
Judicial Conference approved the draft. 1965 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 12, 13.
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that enforced centralization of pretrial proceedings in related multidistrict cases would minimize the costs and burdens engendered by
overlapping and conflicting discovery while preserving the benefits of
local trials in the appropriate districts.' 4 Because the committee
realized, however, that even a pretrial court must be able to dispose of
motions efficiently, section 1407 grants the transferee courts "the usual
powers provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including
authority to render summary judgment, to control and limit pre-trial
proceedings, and to impose sanctions for failure to make discovery or
comply with pre-trial orders."'u
Under this proposal the transferee court will thus have the traditional
pretrial role of all federal district courts, with perhaps one exception.
Seemingly implicit in section 1407's requirement that "each action...
be remanded ...

to the district from which it was transferred""' is the

denial to the transferee court of the power to affect the place of trial of
any action. The section thus appears to prevent a transfer by this court
under other federal transfer provisions. 7 At first glance this restriction
seems insignificant, for there should be no need to enter a permanent
transfer order until the end of pretrial proceedings, when the trial court
14 In the committee's words, § 1407 is designed to "maximize the litigant's traditional
privileges of selecting where, when and how to enforce his substantive rights or assert his
defenses while minimizing possible undue complexity from multi-party jury trials." Co iMrMEE COMMENT at 5.
The transfer of only pretrial proceedings distinguishes § 1407 from the other federal
transfer provisions, all of which provide for transfer of actions in their entirety. These
are: 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (1964) (transfer of proceedings to review deportation
orders); 30 Stat. 554 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 55 (1964) (transfer and consolidation of proceedings
in bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) (transfer for the "convenience of parties and
witnesses" and "in the interest of justice'); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1964) (transfer when an
action has been brought in a district of improper venue); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1964) (transfer to the Court of Claims when an action has been improperly filed in a district court);
28 U.S.C. § 1506(b) (1964) (transfer to a district court when an action has been improperly
filed in the Court of Claims); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964) (transfer of habeas corpus proceedings); Fmn. ADM. R. 54 (transfer of limitation of liability proceedings); FED. R. CRIM. P.
21(b) (transfer "if in the interest of justice').
While these provisions, with the exception of FED. ADm. R. 54, limit the districts to
which the actions may be transferred, § 1407 provides for transfer to any district. Since
it is thus possible for a case to be transferred to a district where venue would not have
existed had the case been brought there originally, § 1407 is in part a venue statute. Congress may permit venue to lie wherever it chooses. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308
U.S. 165 (1939); Rutland Ry. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
15 CoMITrrrEE COMMENT 5.
16 Section 1407, note 2 supra.
17 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964): "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." For other federal transfer provisions, see
note 14 supra.
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will be able to do so. But at the end of pretrial the transferee court
will be better acquainted than the trial court with any given case and
with cases from other districts with which that case might usefully be
consolidated for trial. Thus, to the extent that consolidation to avoid
multiple trials might be desirable, 18 the transferee court would seem the
logical instrument of implementation. The only reason for the restriction would seem to be that a transferor court, which must agree to any
section 1407 transfer,'9 might be more likely to permit that transfer if
it knows that the transferee court cannot undercut its trial jurisdiction.
However, this rationale rests on the rather unlikely premise that district
courts compete for trials. Even to the extent that this is true, it seems
unnecessary so to limit the powers of the transferee court, provided
appellate review of a district court's refusal to permit transfer is avail20
able.
Interestingly, the committee comments that section 1407 "would not
...

exclude transfer under other statutes .

.

. prior to or at the con-

clusion of pre-trial proceedings." 2' 1 It is unclear whether the limiting
phrase should be read as "prior to the conclusion of or at the conclusion
of pretrial proceedings," making transfer obtainable at any time during
pretrial, or whether it should be read as "prior to pretrial proceedings
or at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings," denying transfers while
the transferee court has jurisdiction. If the former interpretation is
correct, section 1407's apparent limitation on transfer during pretrial
must be unintentional. But clearly the committee's language is too ambiguous to provide any substantial justification for a court's reading
section 1407 in a way opposed to its literal prohibition of transfers.
Hence, unless Congress rewords the provision, the general pretrial
powers of the transferee court will probably be limited by the absence
of ability to transfer.
The traditional pretrial powers proposed for the transferee court
contrast sharply with the unprecedented powers to be given the seven
man judicial panel created by the statute. Most important, the panel
is given the authority to decide whether transfer will be beneficial in
18 Although the COMMrx COMMENT extols the virtues of separate trials and remarks
on the "possible undue complexity from multi-party jury trials," COMMrrE COMMENT 6,
the committee and the courts are currently engaged in consolidating many of the electrical
cases for trial. For the purpose of consolidation to avoid multiple trials there have been
more than -twenty § 1404(a) transfers to the Northern District of Illinois of cases involving
two specific electrical product lines. See, e.g., I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d
403 (Sth Cir. 1965); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965).
19 "[N]o action shall be so transferred without the consent of the district court in which
it is pending." Section 1407, note 2 supra.
20 See pp. 572-73 infra.
21 COMMITTEE COMMENT 3.
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the circumstances and to enter a transfer order 2 2 -powers which are
confined to district courts under all other federal transfer provisions.2 3
Although the committee analogizes this part of the panel's function to
the division of the judicial business of some single districts by executive
committees of the district judges, 2 1 this analogy is imperfect because
the panel must obtain the consent of the transferor court before transferring a case, 25 while an executive committee need not. 26 Presumably
consent is required because the transferor court will be well acquainted
with the cases before it and may detect factors militating against transfer which the panel fails to notice. But a strong argument can be made
that such consent is superfluous and should not be required, since it
gives the transferor district judge a veto power over a panel composed
of seven circuit and district judges.27 There is, perhaps, no great need
22
23

Section 1407, note 2 supra.
See note 14 supra for a list of the other federal transfer provisions.

24 CozfMrrra.

COMMENT 7-8.

Section 1407, note 2 supra. Thus a need for voluntary cooperation of judges similar
to that which was difficult to achieve in the electrical cases is only partially eliminated
under section 1407.
26 It would appear that one might more usefully conceive of § 1407 as a combination of § 1404(a), which provides for transfer "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses" and "in the interest of justice," and FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), which permits
a court to consolidate pending cases which involve "common questions of fact." Such a
view encompasses the power of transfer which the district court executive committees do
not possess, § 1407's nature as a venue statute, see note 14 supra, and the availability
of any appellate review, see text accompanying note 34 infra. Seen this way, § 1407
is primarily a consolidation statute with a transfer provision attached only as a procedural
necessity, and the judicial panel would be more closely analogous to a district court acting
under rule 42(a).
27 The Department of Justice, in response to a request for its views on the bill, recommended an amendment: "[W]e believe that the provision of the bill which requires the
consent of the district court from which an action is transferred should be deleted. To require such consent seems superfluous since seven circuit and district judges must consider
the proposed transfer and four members of the panel approve it before it can take place.
Requiring the consent of the transferor district judge would give a veto power and in
essence require voluntary cooperation of all in order to consolidate discovery proceedings."
The Department also recommended that the Government's civil antitrust suits be exempted under the bill, since the Government's purpose in such a suit normally differs from
that of a private litigant: the Government is seeking to protect the public, while private
litigants are interested in damages for past injuries. On the other hand, the Department
stated that government damage suits should be included, for the Government's purpose
in such suits is the same as a private party. Accordingly, the Department recommended
adding a new subsection (g):
(g) Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which the United States
is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws. "Antitrust laws" as used herein
include those acts referred to in the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended (38 Stat.
730; 15 U.S.C. 12) and also include the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1526; 15
U.S.C. 13, 13a and 13b) and the Act of September 26, 1914, as added March 2,
1938 (52 Stat. 116, 117, 15 U.S.C. 56); but shall not include section 4A of the Act
of October 15, 1914, as added July 7, 1955 (69 Stat. 282; 15 U.S.C. 15a).
Other than recommending these two amendments, the Department approved the legisla25
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to authorize the panel to override district court opposition, since "no
district refusing to consent to transfer ...

may make any order for or

permit discovery in conflict with the discovery proceedings in the transferred actions." 28 Also, section 1407 permits the panel to prescribe such
rules as it may wish for the conduct of its business, 29 and the panel
may therefore devise procedures for arguing before a recalcitrant court,
either in person or through a litigant with an interest in transfer.30 This
would assure that the court hears full and detailed arguments for, as
well as against, transfer. Nonetheless, a district court might still arbitrarily and erroneously refuse consent, and, if consent is to be required,
appellate review of such a refusal should be available to prevent un31
warranted frustration of section 1407's purpose.
Given the consent of the transferor court and compliance with section
1407's standards, the panel's mandate to "promote just and efficient conduct of... actions" dictates that it should be able to transfer a case over
the opposition of all parties, for more is at stake than the interests of the
litigants in any one case. Parties to other cases and the federal court
system itself may benefit from transfer and consolidation, and the
preference of the parties in one case for a particular pretrial forum
should be insufficient to prevent transfer of that case. While section
1407 does not expressly give the panel power to transfer over the opposition of the parties, analogies to the powers of district courts under
tion. Letter From Ramsey Clark, Deputy Attorney General, to Representative Emanuel
Celler, Jan. 7, 1966, copy on file in the University of Chicago Law Review office.
28 Section 1407, note 2 supra.
29 Ibid. Among the panel's supplementary powers will be the authority to initiate transfer proceedings on its own motion by giving notice to all affected parties when transfer is
contemplated. Ibid. See Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962),
indicating due process requires a hearing before a transfer can be lawfully made. But see
Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND.
L.J. 99, 123 (1965). The panel will be able to adopt its own procedures for such hearings.
Section 1407, note 2 supra. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938);
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 129 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1942) (indicating that the Constitution requires no fixed procedures in hearings). After transfer the panel will have
authority to assign judges from the transferee district court, with the consent of that court,
to conduct the coordinated pretrial proceedings, and to request interdistrict or intercircuit
assignment of judges for this purpose. It will also be able to assign panel members or
other judges as deposition judges in any district. These are logical and necessary extensions of the power to provide for coordination; the electrical cases demonstrated that varying numbers of judges may be needed at different times during pretrial. See ComMrl-ME
COMMENT 8.

30 It is likely that, as in § 1404(a) mandamus actions, one of the parties will have an
interest in transfer and might represent the panel's position to the court. See Ex parte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965); 6 MooRE,
54.10(2), at 72-73 (2d ed. 1964).
FEDERAL PRACICE
31 See pp. 572-73 infra.
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rule 42(a)32 and section 1404(a) 33 support its existence under section
1407. Congress could, of course, helpfully clarify this issue.
II.

APPELLATE REVIEW

Transfer under section 1407 may appeal strongly to a defendant interested in reducing his exposure to repetitive or conflicting discovery,
or to a plaintiff interested in benefiting from the expanded scope and
possibly reduced expense of joint discovery. Conversely, transfer may
be highly distasteful to a litigant interested in depriving his opponent
of these benefits, or for whom pretrial in a foreign district will mean
inconvenience and expense. These practical effects will make availability of appellate review of section 1407 orders an important issue.
Section 1407 itself fails to mention the availability of any appellate
review. The committee merely says that it drafted section 1407 in such
a way as to insure that appellate review "when available" would take
place in a single circuit court. 34 The phrase "when available" may
indicate that the committee would prefer that review be unavailable
altogether. This inference finds support in the committee's statement
that the panel's function is to be similar to the allocations made by the
executive committees of certain districts, 3 5 since appellate review of
these allocations is available only on the questions of jurisdiction and
venue.36 It may be, however, that the committee merely wishes to avoid

becoming involved in disputes over the availability of review. 7 Whatever the reason, section 1407's unfortunate silence on this point seems
likely to cause consideralle uncertainty in application.
A strong argument can be made that there should be no appellate
review of section 1407 transfers. The judicial panel is to consist of seven
circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief
Justice, 38 and it would seem that such an august membership should
be sufficient to guard against any miscarriage of justice. There is no
reason to assume that any court of appeals would be more qualified
32 Miller v. Baird, 239 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRA rICE
42.02, at 1204 (2d ed. 1964).
33 See I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965); SwindellDressier Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
34 COMMITTEE COMMENT 9-10.

35 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
36 See Levine v. United States, 182 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921
(1951); Burall v. Johnston, 62 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Cal. 1945); Burall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp.
126 (N.D. Cal. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
37 "The proposed section does not attempt to alter or clarify present doctrines as to
the availability or scope of review of transfer orders." COMMITmE COMMENT 10.
38 Section 1407, note 2 supra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 33:558

than the panel to judge the issues involved.39 But if the panel's decision
is to be final and unreviewable, section 1407 should clearly say so.
Therefore, while it is suggested that Congress might eliminate all review of panel decisions, it must be assumed that section 1407's present
silence will leave to the courts the determination of what review will be
available.
The simplest review procedure would be for a court of appeals to
review directly the panel's orders, much as district court orders are
reviewed. But panel orders do not come within the statutes conferring
review jurisdiction on the courts of appeals, 40 and therefore such direct
review of the panel will not be available unless Congress specifically
provides for it. The courts of appeals will have to resort to whatever
other means of review they might have available, exerting their authority directly over the district courts involved.
Effective appellate review, of course, will have to be interlocutory.
Review after final judgment will afford no protection, since the harm
of inconvenience and expense will already have been done. Thus, review will have to be by mandamus rather than appeal, since except in
certain specific instances not here applicable,4 1 appeals are allowed
only from final judgments.4 A means of review is suggested, for example, by district court orders under transfer section 1404(a), which are
not appealable 43 but are often reviewed in the court of appeals by writ
39 Of course the panel will not be infallible. It is possible that discovery proceedings may
unearth facts which were unknown to the panel and which make remand of a given case
desirable. But since the panel has the power to remand a case at any time, the possibility
of such an error does not compel an alternative judicial remand procedure, as long as it
is not impractical or cumbersome to appeal to the panel.
40 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (1964) confer jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review
decisions of district and territorial courts, while 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964) defines "district
court" as a court constituted by chapter 5 of title 28. Nor do panel orders come within the
review jurisdiction conferred on the courts of appeals by other statutes. See the reviser's
notes at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for a list of these statutes. Panel orders do not come within the
statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, either. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-58
(1964).
41 Congress has recognized the need for interlocutory appeals in the following instances:
66 Stat. 423 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 47 (1964) (bankruptcy proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964)
(orders invalidating federal statutes); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) (injunctions issued or refused
by statutory three judge courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964) (certain cases involving injunctions,
receivers, admiralty, or patents, or when a district judge certifies that an immediate appeal
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(1964) (civil rights removal petitions).
42 Long v. Union Pac. R.R., 206 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1953); Breeding Motor Freight Lines,
Inc. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 172 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814
(1949). See also DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
43 E.g., Grossman v. Pearlman, 353 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1965); Littman v. Bache & Co.,
246 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1957). In some cases appeal has been allowed from § 1404(a) orders,
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of mandamus 44 under the general authority of the All Writs Act.4 5
Since the two situations in which a party might wish to seek mandamus in connection with a section 1407 order-when he opposes a
granted or proposed transfer, and when he desires but is refused transfer
-differ significantly, each must be analyzed separately to determine
whether and to what extent appellate review might be available under
section 1407.
Review of Transfer Orders
First, consider the party opposed to transfer. After his case has been
transferred, he might petition the transferee court for remand. 46 If this
is denied, 47 he could then petition the transferee circuit court for a
writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to remand the case. 48 The
but in those cases the orders effectively terminated the litigation. E.g., United States v.
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 (1964); Hohensee v. News
Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 659 (1961).
A strong argument has been made that transfer orders ought to be final and appealable
under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1948). See
Note, Appealability of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YAI.E L.J. 122 (1957). In
Cohen the Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292 as indicating "the purpose to
allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties." 337 U.S. at 545. The Court held an otherwise
interlocutory order appealable because it was a "final disposition of a claimed right which
is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it."
337 U.S. at 546-47. Although transfer orders have these characteristics, the courts have
explicitly held the Cohen doctrine inapplicable. E.g., Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185
F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 851 (1950).
44 E.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), reversing 309 F.2d 953 (8d Cir. 1962);
Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
45 "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
46 The request would assert that the panel erred in making the transfer and perhaps
even that the transferee court consequently lacks jurisdiction. A party might also request
retransfer under § 1404(a) on the basis of the "convenience of parties and witnesses"
and the "interest of justice," since no doctrine of the law of the case has developed under
present transfer provisions. See, e.g., United States Lines Co. v. MacMahon, 285 F.2d 212
(2d Cir. 1960); Sypert v. Miner, 266 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959);
Kitch, supra note 29, at 129-30. But see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Davis, 185 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1950); 1 MooRa, FEDEARAL PRAcIicE
0.145, at 1769 (2d ed. 1964). This might, of
course, put a case in orbit. See Kitch, supra note 29, at 129-30.
47 It may be assumed that the transferee district judge would almost always deny
remand, at least when no more facts are available to him than were available to the
judicial panel which transferred the case. The propriety of the transfer would then be
litigated in the court of appeals. Such a possibility presents the interesting anomaly of a
district or circuit court contradicting a panel of seven district and circuit judges, which
is an important factor arguing against review of a § 1407 order. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
48 One might argue that if the transfer order is faulty and the lower court consequently
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availability of review depends upon whether the circuit court has
power to issue mandamus in such circumstances. At one time many
circuits might have denied that they had such power,49 but in La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co. 50 the Supreme Court stated, with regard to the
circuit courts' general "power" to issue the writ:
The question of naked power to issue mandamus has long
been settled by this Court ....
Since the Court of Appeals
could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings entertain appeals in these cases,, it has power in proper circumstances, as
here, to issue writs of mandamus reaching them.51
We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by
the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial adminis52
tration in the federal system.
The courts of appeals have altered their treatment of transfers in the
aftermath of La Buy 53 and it appears that the transferee circuit will be
lacks jurisdiction, the circuit court would have no jurisdiction or need to order a retransfer. See Kitch, supra note 29, at 111 nA6, 118 & n.84, 120 n.92. But in Magnetic Engineering 9- Manufacturing Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir.
1950), the Second Circuit said that even an erroneous § 1404(a) transfer vested jurisdiction
in the transferee courts, and that the transferee appeals court would have authority to
direct the transferee district court to remand the case. The Supreme Court, in Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 835, 343 (1960), while holding that "the transferee courts could have acquired jurisdiction over these actions only if... validly transferred thereto . .. " and that
the actions had been improperly transferred under § 1404(a), affirmed the order of the
transferee appeals court granting mandamus and directing remand. The court did not explain how, if the district court lacked jurisdiction, the circuit court, or indeed the Supreme
Court, acquired jurisdiction, nor why it was necessary to remand if the case was never
really transferred. The federal courts generally ignore this issue, tacitly assuming the position of the Second Circuit. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953);
Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 1951), af'd, 344 U.S. 861
(1952).
49 At one time, for example, the First Circuit denied -the existence of power to review
any transfer order except one transferring a case out of the circuit, on the rationale that
only then was its appellate jurisdiction endangered. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st
Cir. 1954). The Eighth Circuit followed a narrow approach similar to that of the First
Circuit. Great No. R.R. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1956), af'd on rehearing, 245
F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 855 U.S. 872 (1957); Carr v. Donohue, 201 F.2d 426 (8th
Cir. 1958).
50 352 U.S. 249 (1957), affirming, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955).
51 852 U.S. at 255.
52 Id. at 258.
53 Subsequent to La Buy, in a mandamus case not involving transfer orders, the First
Circuit cited that case as requiring a more liberal view of the mandamus power and referred to its changed attitude, citing In re Josephson, supra note 49, to indicate
its old position. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 883 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 927 (1961) (petition for mandamus to disqualify a district judge). Similarly, the
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empowered to issue mandamus ordering remand of a section 1407 transfer.
Granting that the power exists, the effectiveness of review of transfers into a circuit will depend upon the circumstances in which the
courts will issue the writ. La Buy leaves this to the discretion of the circuit courts, which usually decide in terms of the district courts' "abuse
arbitrariness," or the existence of
of discretion" or "manifest judicial
' 54
"exceptional

circumstances.

The practical significance of these

phrases is that mere error in the exercise of discretion by a district
judge is insufficient to justify issuing the writ.55 Generally, sufficient
cause is found only in instances where a trial court's action has been
in excess of its "jurisdiction," 5 such as transferring to a district where
Eighth Circuit has changed its position and now considers itself to have "power" to review
transfer orders generally. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.
1965). This case also overrules the decision on rehearing in Great No. R.R. v. Hyde, 245
F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872 (1957), which, interestingly enough, came
after La Buy. See note 49 supra.
Of course, since actions under § 1407 are to be remanded to the original districts for
trial, it can be argued that the transferee circuit court will be unable to entertain appeals
from final judgment, and will thus be unable to issue mandamus even according to the
standard in La Buy. But the transferee circuit court might have to assert its appellate
jurisdiction should the district court exercise its power of summary judgment. Also, La
Buy was based not only on the potential ability to entertain appeals but also on the
responsibility of the courts of appeals to exercise supervisory control over the district
courts, and if the transferee circuit court does not have supervisory control of § 1407
pretrial proceedings no circuit does. Thus, it appears that the transferee circuit will be
empowered to issue mandamus.
54 The First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits indicate that issuance of the writ is
reserved for extraordinary circumstances, although they have difficulty defining what is
extraordinary. See Grossman v. Pearlman, 353 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Connell, 295 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1961); In re Union Leader Corp., supra note 53; Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co. v. Sugarman, 272 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1959); Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958); Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457
(9th Cir. 1950).
By comparison, the Third Circuit will not grant mandamus when a trial judge has considered and passed upon the interests stipulated in the transfer statute. All States Freight,
Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952). But see Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld,
308 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1962). The Eighth Circuit speaks of manifest judicial arbitrariness. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965). The Seventh and Tenth
speak of abuse of discretion. Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963);
Butterick Co. v. Will, 316 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1963).
55 E.g., Butterick Co. v. Will, supra note 54; Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel,
301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1962); Sypert v. Miner, 266 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
832 (1959).
56 See Comment, Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compromise with Finality, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1036, 1045-47 (1964).
This reluctance to issue the writ is apparently due to fear of the impact of mandamus
on the calendars of appellate courts and the progress of proceedings below. See La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Crick, The Final
Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 551 (1932); Kitch, supra note 29,
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the action could not have been brought;5 7 transferring without a hearing, in denial of due process;5 8 or transferring in contravention of a constitutional policy. 59
Practice under the present case law thus indicates that the circuit
courts will most probably hold that they have power to review transfer
of actions into their circuits under section 1407, but in practice they
will rarely issue the writ. They will probably be quick to mandamus
the district court if they find a transferred action does not have a "common question of fact" with other actions, since this will go to the panel's
power to transfer. But parties desiring reversal of a section 1407 transfer will most often have to ground their attack on the substantive
requirement that transfers must promote the "just and efficient" conduct of the actions, for in all but the most exceptional cases which the
panel might conceivably wish to transfer, common questions of fact
will clearly exist. Because the panel's "abuse of discretion" must be
asserted, the courts' reluctance to issue the writ under section 1404(a)
to overturn a discretionary finding of convenience and justice indicates
that reversal on this ground will probably be rare in section 1407 cases.
Since the place of pretrial proceedings is generally of less importance
than the place of trial, the courts of appeals will almost certainly defer
to the expertise of the specially appointed and knowledgeable panel of
their peers even more often than they do in reviewing district court
transfer orders under section 1404(a).
Some parties, of course, will desire to have review of a transfer order
in the transferor circuit, but the transferor circuit court does not have
power to order the transferee district court to remand an action unless
the transferor and transferee districts are in the same circuit. Since the
transfer will be effective once the panel enters the order,60 if the transat 117 & n.79. This reluctance seems to be borne out by the experience of the Seventh
Circuit. After a period of liberally granting mandamus in § 1404(a) cases, the Seventh
Circuit received an increased number of petitions for mandamus and consequently cautioned attorneys that they should not file such petitions unless they could make out a
strong case of abuse of discretion. Sypert v. Miner, supra note 55. Since then, the
court has issued the writ only once, in a criminal case where it found a refusal to transfer
was in violation of a constitutional policy. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d
369 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 240 (1964). See Kitch, supra note 29, at 124-25.
57 Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962), reved, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Behimer
v. Sullivan, 261 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Blaski v. Hoffman, 363 U.S. 335
(1960); Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), afl'd, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
58 Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
59 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S.
240 (1964).
60 "The panel's order of transfer shall be ... effective when ... entered." Section 1407,
note 2 supra. Filing of the papers in the transferee court effects the transfer at present,
removing the case from the jurisdiction of the transferor district and its circuit court.
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feror circuit is to intervene it must be able to do so before the panel
transfers the case or else be able to speak with authority directly to the
judicial panel. The only pretransfer review available would be review
of the district judge's consent to transfer, and the time interval during
which a party would be able to petition for such review is likely to be
too short to make such review effective, for the panel will probably not
request the district court to consent, nor will the district court be
likely to consent, until after the panel has decided to transfer. Nor do
the courts of appeals have power to give direct review of the panel. 61
Even if a transferor circuit should determine that it has a general
mandamus power over the panel, it will probably not exercise it. Any
court construing section 1407 will have to give great weight to the
committee's statement that the section was purposefully drafted in such
a way as to insure that appellate review of transfers would take place
in one court of appeals. 2 The only need for review in the transferor
circuit would be to save a party from whatever additional expense is
involved in appealing a possibly faulty order in a foreign circuit, or to
protect the transferor circuit's appellate jurisdiction. It is to be expected that relatively few section 1407 transfer orders will be reversed,
so that few litigants will have to travel unnecessarily; and the transferor circuit's potential appellate jurisdiction will be protected by section 1407's requirement that actions must be remanded to their original
districts for trial.63 The loss of jurisdiction to review discovery is not
sufficiently important to require review of the transfer order; one circuit's review of discovery is enough. Moreover, whatever considerations
may favor review in the transferor circuit would seem to be entirely
overborne by the benefits to be gained from restricting review to the
transferee circuit, for a court with all of the cases before it will be alble
to see more clearly the relationships between the cases, to judge more
easily whether common questions of fact exist, and to decide more accurately whether the just and efficient conduct of the litigation will be
Brabik v. Murphy, 246 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1957); Magnetic Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg.
Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950); Fisher v. United Air Lines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963).
61 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
COTMENT 9-10.
63 The transferee court's power to render summary judgment (see text accompanying
62 Coanusxrr

note 15 supra) presumably would not be sufficient in itself to operate as a threat to the
transferor circuit's potential appellate jurisdiction. If § 1407 should be amended to permit
the transferee court itself to transfer the actions under other federal transfer provisions,
however, protection of appellate jurisdiction will be considerably lessened. See text accompanying note 20 supra. But to use this as a justification for review in the transferor
circuit is to approve of competition for cases, which should be discouraged since it serves no
useful function and can only operate to the detriment of judicial efficiency.
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promoted by transfer. Exclusive appeal in the transferee circuit might
possibly result in a temporarily heavy appellate load in that circuit, but
this could easily be alleviated by transfer of judges under 28 U.S.C.
§ 291.64 Indeed, in many instances it will be more efficient to deal with
this temporary overload in one circuit than to deal with one-tenth the
overload in ten circuits.
Review of Refusals to Transfer

While the preceding analysis dealt only with the availability of review to rescind or prevent transfer, cases are certain to arise in which
the panel will refuse transfer or a district court will refuse to consent.
The availability of appellate review of such refusals will also be an
important issue.
If any court is to give relief when the panel refuses to transfer a case,
it must have authority over the panel, because only the panel has the
power of transfer under section 1407.65 It is not clear that any court
will have this authority, but even positing such authority, a party should
probably be denied relief because he has no "right" to consolidation,
which is the sole objective of transfer. While consolidated pretrial may
be less expensive to a party and may result in a broader and more
thorough discovery, these interests alone appear to be insufficient to
overcome the policy against piecemeal appeal. This rationale is reflected
in the present trial consolidation rule, Federal Rule 42(a), which
grants litigants no right to consolidation even if the requirements of
the rule are met. 6 In only one case does it appear that the appellate
courts have granted so much as a hearing on an interlocutory petition
requesting review of a refusal to consolidate, and in that case the court
declined on the merits to issue the writ.67 The only other reason for
permitting review would be to provide additional assurance that the
vital interest of efficiency in the federal court system, for the furtherance
of which section 1407 is primarily designed, will be served. But it would
appear that the panel alone will be sufficient to accomplish this purpose,
which indeed might be defeated by unnecessary appeals from panel
refusals to transfer.
When, however, a district judge refuses to consent after the panel
64 This section provides for intercircuit assignment of judges by the Chief Justice.
65 "Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel .... " Section 1407, note 2 supra.

66 See Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Counterclaims, 2 F.R.D. 250,
(1941); Comment, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 373,
(1963).
67 MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958) (allowing interlocutory appeal
der the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1948).
note 43 supra).
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has decided that coordinated pretrial would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions, the need for additional assurance that the
interests of the federal court system are being properly served would
seem to justify granting an interlocutory appeal. The best solution
might be to deny the district judge veto power over the panel. 68 But
if Congress does not delete this veto power, the traditional mandamus
power of the circuit courts over the district courts should ensure review
of the refusal to transfer. The only question would seem to be whether
section 1407 is intended to confer an absolute right on the district judge
to refuse his consent. The sole justification for such unlimited discretion would be the prevention of excessive interlocutory appeals; but the
appellate courts can sharply curtail the danger of frivolous interlocutory
appeals by entertaining only those petitions which show a strong likelihood that claims are presented which, if borne out on argument, will
result in issuance of the writ. In this way the courts could prevent the
delay and expense of unnecessary interlocutory appeal while assuring
that the interests of the federal judicial system in avoiding duplication
of effort in pretrial proceedings are protected against district court
abuse of discretion. It should be relatively simple to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion; that is, whether the district judge
has a reasonable basis for holding that transfer of the particular case
would not promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions in light
of the general interest in consolidation and the parties' interests in the
particular circumstances.
III.

CRITERIA OF TRANSFERABILITY

Deservedly, section 1407 is certain to be praised in light of its objective of economy for the litigants and the courts. The panel, however, will have to decide what precise limitations should operate on its.
discretion to transfer.
The first factor the panel might consider in deciding whether ta
transfer is suggested by the circumstances which generated the proposal:
the number of cases to be consolidated. Typically, cases transferred
under section 1407 will involve numerous plaintiffs and relatively few
defendants, with the result that the expense and inconvenience caused
a given plaintiff by pretrial in a foreign district will be fairly independent of the number of cases involved, while the benefit to defendants in terms of relief from overlapping discovery and the benefit
to the federal judiciary in terms of decreased work and relief of over68 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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crowded dockets will increase rapidly as the number of cases increases. 69
Hence the smaller the number of cases involved, the less likely that the
gain in efficiency will exceed the cost and inconvenience of transfer.
The second factor the panel might consider is the number and complexity of the factual issues unique to each case, as compared with the
issues common to all. If the cases contain a number of complex, individualized issues, the gain in efficiency through co rdinated pretrial
on the common issues may be offset by the cost to parties of inconvenient pretrial on the non-common issues. A solution to this problem,
of course, would be coordinating discovery on the common issues while
staying discovery on the dissimilar issues until remand. This would be
similar to the practice of holding separate trials on the issues of liability
and damages in tort cases 70 and the practice under rule 42(a) of consolidating only on selected issues.7 1 The effectiveness of such a procedure would depend on the ability of the panel to segregate the issues
to be investigated at pretrial. Section 1407 does not provide for the
transfer of actions in part,72 nor does it give the panel authority to limit
the transferee court's scope of inquiry. However, the panel does have
authority to remand cases before the conclusion of pretrial, and this
authority, coupled with the transferee district's desire to cooperate in
achieving section 1407's objectives and to avoid taking on time-consuming jobs, may be sufficient to give the panel effective control. Ideally,
Congress could give the panel clear-cut authority to segregate issues.
A third factor which the panel might consider is the pattern of settlement in many types of cases. Mass tort cases, such as air crashes, for
example, in which liability is either clear or limited because of 'damage
69 Consolidation under § 1407 will seldom be without its price. Many parties may
find it inconvenient and expensive to conduct pretrial in a foreign district. Also, when
actions are coordinated for pretrial, more intensive discovery can be conducted than otherwise. In particular, parties can obtain relatively inexpensively the depositions of witnesses
they would not otherwise interrogate, and the incentive to determine what discovery
might be unnecessary is lost. Further, a successful coordinated pretrial depends heavily
on the ability of counsel to organize for effective cooperation; otherwise, the court is forced
to organize the proceedings in detail. See Neal & Goldberg, The ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 625 (1964). This involves time
and effort. However, these effects may also decrease with a smaller number of cases.
70 See Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961), 74 HAav. L. REv. 781 (1961).
71 See United States v. Holtz, 54 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Cal. 1944), aff'd sub nom. Kuehn
v. United States, 162 F.2d 716 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947); Hotel George
V v. McLean, I F.R.D. 241 (D.D.C. 1940); Comment, supra note 66, 30 U. CH. L. REv. at
377.
72 Section 1407 does give the panel authority to separate any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim and remand it before the remainder of the action is remanded,
see note 2 supra, but this does not give the panel authority ,to separate any issue.
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ceilings, will seldom reach the courts, for the defendant will settle without permitting the case to be litigated. Even if the trial stage is reached,
3
one or two trials usually establish a pattern for settlement" It will

nearly always be less costly in terms of time and money, both for the
courts and the parties, to conduct pretrial of a single action and to try
it individually than to conduct coordinated pretrial proceedings for
fifty different cases when only one is likely to come to trial" 4 Such
established settlement patterns may in many instances indicate to the
panel that transfer will be unnecessary.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By allowing discovery on common questions of fact to be conducted
simultaneously for related cases, section 1407 should eliminate duplication of effort and attendant cost and congestion. In order to facilitate
achievement of this goal, however, it would seem that in several areas
the operation of the statute should be clarified and perhaps extended.
For instance, Congress could easily clarify the power of the transferee
court to order a further transfer of cases to the most convenient forum
for trial and also the power of the panel to transfer over the opposition
of parties. This might avoid needless litigation and possibly a deleterious
decision. Congress should also take a clear stand on the problem of interlocutory review. It is suggested that Congress should seriously consider eliminating any appellate review of section 1407 orders in light
of the safeguard of the large and august panel membership. Even if
Congress is unwilling to eliminate review entirely, it should indicate
what review is to be available, and should at least indicate that the
transferor district judge does not have unlimited discretion to refuse his
consent to transfer. Also, in order to facilitate the efficient operation of
the section in cases where many non-common issues exist, Congress
should give the panel clear authority to limit the issues for which
coordinated discovery may be held. These measures would prevent
much needless expense and greatly enhance the value of the proposal.
73 See Galiher, The Defendant's Lawyer Looks at Settlement, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 65
(1964). Since July 1960 there have been four major air crashes in Illinois. 1962 CAB ANN.
REP. 45, 46; 1961 CAB ANN. REP. 39, 40. Only a few scattered cases have come to the
attention of the courts and no opinions have been published.
74 In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (ElD. Wash. 1962),
modified, 535 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), a large number of the
claims arising from a single air crash were consolidated for pretrial and trial. Discovery
was "exceedingly expensive, extensive, and burdensome in time and effort." Id. at 712. Although the accident occurred in April 1958 and "in spite of the very great diligence of
counsel in their conduct of discovery proceedings," a pretrial order could not even be
framed until October 1961. Id. at 712-13.
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The panel and the courts can also facilitate the efficient operation of
this section. The transferor appeals court, for example, should decline
to review any transfers under section 1407, leaving such review to the
transferee circuit, and should also decline to review a refusal of transfer
by the panel. This court should, however, review a refusal of consent
by the transferor district judge, and should order him to consent if he
abuses his discretion. This would help assure proper serving of the interests of the federal court system.
The panel, for its part, might consider three factors in deciding
whether to transfer: the number of cases to be consolidated; the number
and complexity of issues unique to each case; and the pattern of settlement in the particular cases to be consolidated. If the panel has the
ability to segregate the issues to be investigated at pretrial the efficient
operation of section 1407 can be extended.

